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IN SUPPORT OF THE WHITE PAPER: WHY
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS SHOULD NOT
RECEIVE IMMUNITY FROM TRADITIONAL
NOTIONS OF VICARIOUS AND CONTRIBUTORY
LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The object [in developing new communications technology] is
not simply to create a zillion-channel cable-TV capacity. It is
to empower the American people with interactive, multiway
networks that allow the emergence of all these new services and
products that we can't yet imagine. In a real sense, the printing
press made possible the modern nation-state and representative
democracy by giving citizens of a large geographic area enough
civic knowledge to participate in decision-making. If the
printing press did that, then how much richer in spirit can our
country be if our people are empowered with the knowledge that
these high-capacity computer networks can distribute? It's a
very exciting prospect.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Vignette
At two o'clock on a Friday morning in Sibly, Iowa, a thirteen-year-
old boy, up past his bedtime, sits in front of a computer screen, bathed in
the cool, gray glow of an eighteen-inch monitor. His stereo speakers,
perched precariously above his bed, are running through his state-of-the-art,
Pentium-powered personal computer.2 He is exploring different areas
within America Online ("AOL").3 He finds the "Classic Rock Chat"
1. Interview with Al Gore, Vice President of the United States, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 30.
2. "Pentium" is the brand name of a computer chip manufactured by Intel. DENIS HOWE,
FREE ON-LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/ [hereinafter FODOC].
(Mar. 30, 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
3. Founded in 1985, America Online, Inc.... is the global leader in the market for
interactive services. AOL offers its more than 3.5 million members a wide variety
of services via personal computer and other intelligent devices. These include
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section on AOL and opens an intriguing file under the heading "Aerosmith
- A Private Collection of Favorites." These files are comprised of video
clips and segments of songs-specifically, Dave Johnson's favorite video
clips and favorite song segments. Dave Johnson is a fifteen-year-old from
Newport Beach, California, who has created a home page4 on the
Internet,5 which among other things, contains computer files full of his
favorite music and snippets of video.
Dave does not think of himself as a copyright infringer. Far from it.
He is a high school junior who runs track and loves music. Because
Dave's father works in the computer industry, the exposure to new
technology interested him enough to create a virtual scrapbook embodying
his myriad personal interests-a "home page." Dave created a home page
that is maintained by Netcom, a service that creates and maintains home
electronic mail, conferencing, software, computing support, interactive magazines
and newspapers, online classes, as well as easy and affordable access to the
Internet .... Headquartered in Vienna, Virginia, AOL employs more than 2500
people located in 16 cities across the United States .... AOL plans to extend its
global presence to Europe in 1995.
AMERICA ONLINE, INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
4. On the World Wide Web, [a user friendly system for document access using a universal
language, HyperText Markup] the top level document relates to an individual or institution. This
page has a Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") [which guides users to a particular information
resource on the Internet] consisting of just a hostname, e.g., http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/. All other
pages on a server are usually accessible by following links from the home page. FODOC, supra
note 2.
5. [T]he internet is the world's largest computer network .... The 'Net' evolved in
the U.S. from a military research program in the late 1960s, but today the
government has almost no role in its operation; the 'Net' is unregulated and extends
far beyond America's boundaries.... In 1981 there were only about 200 'host'
computers on the Internet [a host is a computer connected directly to the Internet].
The most recent survey puts the number at over 5 million. Each host can provide
access for one person or an entire organization.... More than 30,000,000 people
have access to the Internet worldwide.
About the Internet Connection (available in America Online, Internet Connection library);
A key idea in the ARPA [Advanced Research Projects Agency, a group funded by
the military to explore network technology] research was a new approach to
interconnecting LANs [Local Area Networks, a computer network technology
designed to connect computers across a short distance, e.g., inside a building] and
WANs [Wide Area Networks, any network technology that can span large
geographic distances] that became known as an internetwork. The term is usually
abbreviated internet, and is applied to both the project and to the prototype network
that was built. To distinguish their internet from other intemets, researchers
working on the ARPA project adopted the convention of writing internet in
lowercase when referring to internetworks in general, and writing Internet with an
uppercase I when referring to their experimental prototype. The convention persists.
The key point is: ARPA funded research to investigate ways to solve the problem
of incompatible networks. Both the project and the prototype system that
researchers built became known by the name Internet.
DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 54 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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pages for paying customers. So far, Dave's site has received 10,000
"hits," or requests from other computers to access his home page. One hit
came from Anne Nelson, a less sophisticated but still Internet-savvy AOL
subscriber from Tampa, Florida. She downloaded the Dave Johnson
"Aerosmith" file onto her own PC, and later uploaded it onto an existing
bulletin board section on AOL. Thus, it is accessible by any one of several
million AOL subscribers-in Sibly, Iowa, for example.
This Comment answers the following query: Should America Online
be held vicariously or contributorily liable for copyright infringement? As
a natural corollary to that question, this Comment briefly, and somewhat
summarily, considers the liability of Dave Johnson and Anne Nelson.
This Comment will show that under the current copyright regime, the
distribution of Steven Tyler's 6 songs and Geffen Records' sound
recordings and video clips is an unauthorized distribution and display of
copyrighted materials. But that is merely a threshold inquiry. The more
probing question is, assuming infringement, who is liable? Dave Johnson?
Anne Nelson? AOL? The question is somewhat straightforward for Dave
Johnson and Anne Nelson; it is more controversial, however, when applied
to AOL.
This Comment analyzes these questions in light of the recent report
by President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF"),
entitled, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights,7 ("White
Paper")8 which became publicly available in September 1995.9  In
6. Steven Tyler is the lead singer and primary songwriter for the musical group, Aerosmith.
Aerosmith's musical work was a product of Geffen Records. See Aerosmith, Gel a Grip (Geffen
Records 1994).
7. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. The IITF consists of high-
level representatives of the federal agencies that play a major role in the development and
application of information and telecommunications technologies. Working together with the
private sector, the participating agencies will develop comprehensive technology, telecom-
munications, and information policies and promote applications that aim to meet the needs of the
federal agencies and the populace. The IITF tries to build consensus among the competing
interests with a stake in these developing technologies. The late Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of
Commerce, served as chair for the IITF at the time of the White Paper's publication. The Task
Force operates under the authority of the White House Office and Technology Policy and the
National Economic Council.
8. "White Paper" is a term applied to documents created at the request of the Presidential
Administration containing legislative recommendations. In the world of copyright law, there is
presently only one such document, and it can safely be referred to simply as the "White Paper."
9. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 1.
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February 1993, President Clinton formed the IITF to study and implement
the Administration's vision for effective use of the National Information
Infrastructure ("NII").' 0
A scholarly discussion on the state of copyright law in light of
currently emerging technology is nothing new. This topic is the subject of
numerous law review articles and other commentary, much of which will
be referred to in this Comment." The White Paper, however, is an
enormously important document in the development of intellectual property
rights as they relate to the Internet, and thus it stands apart from all other
commentary on the subject.
The White Paper is worthy of in-depth analysis because the legislative
recommendations it proposed were almost immediately turned into
presently pending legislation. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Patrick
Leahy (D-Vermont) authored Senate Bill 1284, entitled "NII Copyright
Protection Act of 1995. ' 'I2 S.B. 1284 is a virtually unmodified version of
legislative recommendations contained at the end of the White Paper.'3
Correspondingly, Representatives Carlos Moorhead (R-California), Patricia
Schroeder (D-Colorado), and Howard Cable (R-North Carolina) authored
House Bill 2441.'4
Together, these bills represent a wholesale adoption of the IITF
proposals. Virtually all of the stakeholders in this technology lobbied the
IITF as though they were lobbying Congress because they knew that their
recommendations likely would be immediately adopted by the intellectual
property committees in the legislature. 5  One of the reasons why
10. Id. "National Information Infrastructure: The emerging information infrastructure in the
United States; the Internet forms the first part of the infrastructure." COMER, supra note 5, at
294.
11. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace ", 55
U. Prrr. L. REV. 993 (1994); Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic
Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80
IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995).
12. See generally Graeme Browning, Copycats, NAT'L J., Jan. 6, 1996, at 23.
13. The White Paper concludes with seven specific legislative recommendations for actual
changes to the copyright law. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 239.
14. "Authored" is a term used loosely here because each of these bills simply adopted the
specific recommendations contained at the end of the White Paper.
15. Interview with Jeff Harleston, Staff Member of the Advisory Council of the National
Information Infrastructure, (Jan. 29, 1996). The members of the Advisory Council include
representatives of industry, labor, academia, public interest groups, and state and local
governments. The council provides advice on all the issues facing the IITF and assembles groups
of experts to work with the working groups of the IITF. The Advisory Council has 37 members,
appointed by the United States Secretary of Commerce. Id.
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Congress readily sponsored the White Paper recommendations was because
of the tremendous volume of input from interested parties. The IITF
received extensive feedback from online service providers, representatives
of "copyright industries" such as the Recording Industry Association of
America, publishers, performance rights societies, and potential users of the
Internet.1
6
Additionally, the White Paper is significant because it is the first
articulation by the current, or for that matter, any presidential ad-
ministration regarding intellectual property law as it relates to the NI. 7
The combination of its novelty, broad-based input, and impact through
legislative enactment makes the White Paper a subject worthy of intensive
study and criticism.
Ultimately, legislation ensuing from White Paper recommendations
will govern commerce on the Internet as it relates to copyright law. The
subject of this Comment focuses not on a particular change suggested by
the White Paper, but rather on equally important recommen-
dation-preserving the existing vicarious liability standard under copyright
law for online commercial service providers.
B. The Status Quo
It is difficult to get excited about arguing for the status quo. Much
of legal scholarship calls for change. But in this instance, given the strong
arguments by online service providers for fundamental change in the
Copyright Act," support of the administration's recommendations on this
topic is appropriate and perhaps essential. Simply put, the White Paper
recommends that the Copyright Act maintain traditional standards of
liability for online service providers in today's emerging, nontraditional
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
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environment. 9 In other words, the White Paper suggests that the law
maintain the status quo.
This author concedes that at some point, technological advances will
outstrip the ability of copyright law to adequately address the legal
questions they raise.20 That point has not yet arrived, however, and until
it does, conventional notions of infringement and traditional standards of
liability should apply. Internet technology is capable of many things, but
at its core, it simply provides access to and transfer of documents, pictures,
film, and audio with unprecedented ease. This developing network does
not now, or in this author's opinion, in the foreseeable future, signal the
end of intellectual property.
In order to discern whether the current copyright scheme is adequate
to address liability questions for online service providers-and whether the
White Paper recommendations on this topic are sound-an initial review
of the current copyright scheme is necessary. This review of basic
copyright law will show how the 1976 statute and relevant case law
contemplate, and in fact require, vicarious liability for online service
providers, as called for by the White Paper.
The fundamental source of protection for copyright owners derives
from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which provides
19. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137-38.
The Working Group believes it is-at best-premature to reduce the liability of any
type of service provider in the NIl environment. On-line service providers currently
provide a number of services. With respect to the allowance of uploading of
material by their subscribers, they are, in essence, acting as an electronic
publisher....
It would be unfair-end set a dangerous precedent--to allow one class of
distributors to self-determine their liability by refusing to take responsibility. This
would encourage intentional and willful ignorance.
Exempting or reducing the liability of service providers prematurely would
choke development of marketplace tools that could be used to lessen their risk of
liability and the risk to copyright owners, including insuring against harm caused
by their customers, shifting responsibility for infringement to the infringing
subscriber through indemnification and warranty agreements, licensing (including
collective license agreements), educating their subscribers about infringement and
using technological protections, such as tracking mechanisms. Id. (citation
omitted).
20. See Larry Kenswil, Is Copyright Adequate Protection in the Digital Age?, 1 MULTIMEDIA
L. REP. 25 (1995).
Eventually, the intellectual property laws that are now on the books will prove to
be inadequate. You can extrapolate the law to accommodate new circumstances
only so far. A law that was written when books could only be read after a press
printed them and movies could only be viewed in theaters after studios printed reels
of film doesn't easily adapt to the coming age of solid state memory storage of
virtual reality.
Id. at 27.
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that "the Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries."" The implementation of this power, in its present form, is the
Copyright Act of 1976.22 In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory,23 the court stated, "the purpose of the copyright law is to
create the most efficient and productive balance between protection
(incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture
and development. '2' Balancing society's interest in the freedom of
information against the private economic needs of individual authors is
central to the philosophy underlying copyright law. 25 To encourage
individuals to create original works of authorship, Congress has granted a
limited monopoly to authors, that gives them "the necessary bargaining
capital to garner a fair price for the value of the works passing into public
use."26  In other words, this limited monopoly gives potential authors
economic incentives to be creative.
Congress limited the monopoly granted to copyright holders to the
following five exclusive rights, which owners may themselves exercise or
license others to exercise:
1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease or lending; 4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and 5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810.
23. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
24. Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
25. The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consid-
eration. . . . "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors." It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (citations omitted).
26. John Gastineau, Bent Fish: Issues of Ownership and Infringement in Digitally Processed
Images, 67 IND. L.J. 95, 125 (1991).
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picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
2 7
Additionally, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to authorize the
foregoing."
The Copyright Act defines a copyright infringer as: "anyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 118 ... or who imports copies or phonorecords into
the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the
copyright.,
29
The elements of infringement are:
(1) substantial similarity as a result of (2) copying (3) protected
material. Stated differently, in order to win an infringement
lawsuit, a plaintiff must prove three things: (1) that the
defendant's work was copied from the plaintiff's (i.e.,
"derivation"); (2) that the copying amounted to excessive
appropriation of protected material; and (3) as a result, the
defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's.3°
Similarity of unprotected material, even as a result of copying, is not
infringement. Furthermore, an independent creation is not infringement, no
matter how similar the defendant's work is to the plaintiff's work."
Returning to the hypothetical scenario involving Anne Nelson, Dave
Johnson, and AOL,32 the foregoing discussion of exclusive rights and the
definitions of infringement arguably show that Dave Johnson is a copyright
infringer. Geffen Records owns the copyright in Aerosmith's sound
recordings and videos; likewise, Steven Tyler and his publishing company
own the copyright in the musical compositions.33
Under § 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act, both Geffen Records and
Steven Tyler have the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted works,
to distribute copies of the copyrighted works, and, in the case of the video,
to display the copyrighted work publicly. Additionally, both parties have
the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly.34
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 501(a) (emphasis added).
30. LIONEL S. SOBEL, MATERIALS ON AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 350
(1995). Lionel S. Sobel is a Professor of Copyright Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
31. Id.
32. See supra part I.
33. See supra, note 6.
34. Songwriters have a traditionally recognized public performance right, and various
performance rights societies exist to police the public performance of music. DONALD S.
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In creating a home page containing the copyrighted material, including
the songs, the sound recordings and the audiovisual works, Dave Johnson
directly infringed upon Steven Tyler's exclusive right to reproduce,
distribute copies of, and perform the copyrighted songs publicly. Similarly,
Dave Johnson infringed upon Geffen Records' rights to reproduce,
distribute, and possibly publicly perform the sound recordings and
audiovisual works under the Digital Performance Right in Sound Record-
ings Act of 1995. 35
By later uploading Dave Johnson's files onto AOL, Anne Nelson is
directly infringing on Steven Tyler's and Geffen Records' exclusive rights
to distribute, display, and reproduce copies of the protected material.36
PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 233 (2d ed. 1994). More
recently, Congress passed legislation, which may well encompass this type of digital transmission
of sound recordings and audiovisual works, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this
Comment. 17 U.S.C. § 101, 106, 111, 114, 115, 119, 801-03 (1996).
35. H.R. 1506, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Introduced in January of this year, the bill's purpose is to grant copyright owners
of sound recordings the right to authorize certain digital transmissions of their
works, and to be compensated for others. An exclusive right is provided for
interactive services such as audio-on-demand, celestial jukeboxes and pay-per-listen.
It's important to note that until this bill was enacted sound recordings were the only
U.S. copyrighted work [sic] denied the right of public performance.
Performance Rights Bill Finally Passed and Signed, Quarterly Newsletter (RECORDING INDUS.
ASS'N OF AM.), Fall 1995, at 1-2.
36. Suppose a cyberspace user receives an interesting personal message by electronic
mail from a friend. This recipient decides to forward a copy of the message, also
by electronic mail, to a third party. The third party, who does not know the
message's author, then decides to forward the message to all the members of an on-
line discussion group.... Perhaps this forum has several hundred members, all of
whom now receive the original message.
Does the original author of the message, who ... is unhappy and surprised
by this extensive publication of the message, have a cause of action against either
the friend or the third party?
Copying and forwarding mail is a common practice in cyberspace, but many
cyber residents have not considered its possible unlawfulness.... [T]here are laws
of ... copyright in "real" space, but they were designed for a world in which
copying a message to thousands of people took considerable time, effort and
expense, and naturally gave the would-be forwarder pause for thought about issues
such as privacy and copyright. With cyberspace, the argument goes, it's a new ball
game.
The facts may be generalized more abstractly, however: someone takes a
work of authorship, makes thousands of copies of it, and distributes them to a
segment of the public with no compelling educational, charitable, or other worthy-
purpose reason for doing so. At this level, the question is not new at all. It is, in
fact, an easy case: the described conduct is clearly within the letter and spirit of the
Copyright Act's prohibition against reproduction of copyrighted material without
authorization.
Hardy, supra note 1, at 997-98 (emphasis added). The term Cyberspace was popularized in 1984
by William Gibson, a science fiction writer, who used the phrase in his novel, "Neuromancer."
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While it is possible to debate Dave Johnson's and Anne Nelson's
liability, the existing copyright law, in § 106, which sets forth the exclusive
rights of a copyright owner, and § 501(a), which defines infringement,
arguably contemplates liability for both Dave Johnson and Anne Nelson.
These conclusory opinions regarding the liability of the direct infringers are
a backdrop to the more complex question of whether vicarious liability
should attach to AOL.
C. Vicarious Infringement
The infringement analysis takes on a different character when the
defendant does not actually copy the plaintiff's protected work, but rather
provides a forum or an opportunity within which infringement takes place.
For example, should AOL be liable for merely providing and maintaining
the hypothetical "Classic Rock" bulletin board section on its service?37
In 1963, the Second Circuit addressed the notion of vicarious infringement
in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. :38
This action for copyright infringement presents us with a picture
all too familiar in copyright litigation: a legal problem vexing in
its difficulty, a dearth of squarely applicable precedents, a
business setting so common that the dearth of precedents seems
inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance from
the terms of the Copyright Act.39
In this case, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. sued Jalen Amusement
Company, Inc. for copyright infringement.' Jalen operated the
phonograph record department in several stores of the H.L. Green Company
("Green"), under written licenses from Green.4' The District Court Judge
found Jalen liable as a direct infringer, but did not impose liability on
Green as a vicarious infringer.42 On appeal, the Second Circuit held in
relevant part, that:
the imposition of liability upon the Green Company, even in the
absence of an intention to infringe or knowledge of infringe-
See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER, 55-56 (1984).
37. The "Classic Rock" bulletin board section is a fiction included merely to illustrate the
types of bulletin boards or forums maintained by various online services. The author does not
intend to imply that this particular bulletin board exists on AOL or that AOL has actually engaged
in any infringing activity.
38. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
39. Id. at 305.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 306.
42. Id.
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ment, is not unusual. As one observer has noted, "Although
copyright infringements are quite generally termed piracy, only
a minority of infringers fly the Jolly Roger." . . . While there
have been some complaints concerning the harshness of the
principle of strict liability in copyright law .. .courts have
consistently refused to honor the defense of absence of
knowledge or intention. The reasons have been variously stated.
"[T]he protection accorded literary property would be of little
value if . . . insulation from payment of damages could be
secured... by merely refraining from making inquiry."... "It
is the innocent infringer who must suffer, since he, unlike the
copyright owner, either has an opportunity to guard against the
infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the ability to guard
against the infringement (by an indemnity agreement... and/or
by insurance)." '43
The court extended this reasoning, which was traditionally used to
support liability against innocent infringers, to encompass the vicarious
infringer scenario:
[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police
carefully the conduct of its concessionaire Jalen; our judgment
will simply encourage it to do so, thus placing responsibility
where it can and should be effectively exercised." Green's
burden will not be unlike that quite commonly imposed upon
publishers, printers, and vendors of copyrighted materials.4
The court's ultimate justification for holding Green liable was that:
[I]n many cases, the party found strictly liable is in a position to
police the conduct of the "primary" infringer. Were we to hold
otherwise, we might foresee the prospect-not wholly un-
real--off... "dummy" concessions and shielding their own eyes
from the possibility of copyright infringement, thus creating a
buffer against liability while reaping the proceeds of infringe-
ment.46
The logic of this holding is inescapable. If the threshold of liability
allowed facilitators of infringement to escape by claiming lack of
43. 316 F.2d at 308 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
44. Online service providers object to vicarious liability in part because they claim they have
no way of adequately policing information on their services. See infra part II.A.
45. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 308 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 309.
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knowledge, there would be virtually no "downside" to infringement as a
profitable enterprise. An individual could benefit from infringing activity
for as long as possible. When the copyright holder finally becomes aware
of the infringement and takes action, the vicarious infringer can simply
claim lack of knowledge and smugly deposit into its own account the
revenue rightfully owed the copyright owner.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,47 a leading
copyright case, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions sued
Sony Corporation on a contributory infringement theory.4" The plaintiffs'
essential argument was that by manufacturing and distributing Betamax
video tape recorders, Sony was contributing to the infringement that would
take place once consumers taped television programs and engaged in
unauthorized "time-shifting." '49  As a justification for vicarious and
contributory liability, the Supreme Court stated:
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another. In contrast, the Patent Act
expressly brands anyone who "actively induces infringement of
a patent" as an infringer ... and further imposes liability on
certain individuals labeled "contributory" infringers .... The
absence of such express language in the copyright statute does
not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringe-
ments on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the
infringing activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying
the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.50
47. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
48. Id. at 425. This case is famous perhaps because of the notoriety of the parties and the
significance of the decision for consumers. Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions
ultimately lost the case because the Supreme Court held that time shifting, while unauthorized,
is not necessarily an infringement. Id. at 456. "Time-shifting" is the practice of recording a
program that is aired at one time in order to view it at a later time. Id. at 421. The Court stated
that a manufacturer is not liable for contributory infringement as long as the product is "capable
of substantial noninfringing uses." Id. at 417.
The product and/or service that most online service providers furnish is capable of
noninfringing uses. See discussion infra part III. The Supreme Court in Sony did recognize the
validity of imposing vicarious and/or contributory liability for copyright infringement on third
parties where appropriate. For a discussion of contributory liability, see infra part III.
49. Id. at 421.
50. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Copyright Act of 1976 specifically recognizes an exception to
vicarious liability for "passive carriers."'', Where a third-party transmitter
has no direct or indirect control over the content or selection of the
primary transmissions or the particular recipients of those transmissions,
vicarious liability will not attach.52 Specifically, section 111(a) reads:
The secondary transmission of a primary transmission em-
bodying a performance or display of a work is not an infringe-
ment of copyright if... (3) the secondary transmission is made
by any carrier who has no direct or indirect control over the
content or selection of the primary transmission or over the
particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose
activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist
solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications
channels for the use of others ......
From its plain language, § 111(a)(3) does not provide the narrow
escape from vicarious liability that would relieve online service providers.
For reasons that are clear from a cursory reading of the statute, online
service providers may not be exempt under this provision.'
The foregoing highlights the basic structure of liability for direct and
vicarious copyright infringement. This structure provides a framework for
analyzing the White Paper recommendation that, in appropriate instances,
the online service providers should be held vicariously liable for copyright
infringement. The preceding discussion of the status quo for third party
liability through vicarious and contributory infringement demonstrates how
neatly online service providers fit within this existing structure.
II. SUPPORTING THE WHITE PAPER'S KEY ASSERTIONS REGARDING
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The White Paper's central arguments for holding online service
providers vicariously liable include the following: (1) Online service
providers have a business relationship with their subscribers and may seek
indemnification from their subscribers. They are in a better position than
the copyright owner to stop infringing activity.55  (2) Online service
51. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1976).
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. The White Paper does concede, however, that where an online service provider provides
only the "wires and conduits" for transmission, it would have a good argument for an exemption
from liability. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137.
55. Id. at 131-32.
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providers are analogous to various other types of intermediaries who deal
in copyright-protected works and require no exceptional treatment. 6
(3) The legislative history for the 1976 Copyright Act reflects that Congress
considered and rejected altering the standards of liability for inter-
mediaries. 7 This Comment examines each of these arguments in turn.
A. The Business Relationship Between Online Service Providers
and Subscribers
The White Paper states:
Online service providers have a business relationship with their
subscribers. They-and, perhaps only they-are in the position
to know the identity and activities of their subscribers and to
stop unlawful activities. And, although indemnification from
their subscribers may not reimburse them to the full extent of
their liability and other measures may add to their cost of doing
business, they are still in a better position to prevent or stop
infringement than the copyright owner."
This argument focuses on the degree of control the service providers
have over the infringers. The degree of control is significant because
liability for vicarious infringement is determined by examining the
defendant's relationship to the direct infringer.59 Essentially, the more
control the defendant has over the activities of the direct infringer, coupled
with the defendant's direct financial benefit from the infringing activity,
the more likely the defendant will be found vicariously liable.'
The drafters of the White Paper apparently are cognizant of this
tradition. They state:
With respect to the allowance of uploading by their subscribers,
they are, in essence, acting as an electronic publisher. In other
instances, they perform other functions. No one rule may be
appropriate. If an entity provided only the wires and conduits-
such as the telephone company, it would have a good argument
for an exemption if it was truly in the same position as a
common carrier and could not control who or what was on its
56. Id. at 130.
57. Id. at 133-35.
58. Id. at 131-32 (citation omitted).
59. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, § 6.1 at 708 (1989) (citing F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS, §10.1 (2d ed. 1986)).
60. Id. (citations omitted).
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system. The same could be true for an on-line service provider
who unknowingly transmitted encrypted infringing material. 6,
The recommendations that "no one rule may be appropriate," and that
the online service provider should be held liable only to the degree it had
control over the direct infringer's activity, seem reasonable. Unfortunately,
this does not create a bright-line rule. Furthermore, it engenders criticism
from some commentators who believe that because intermediaries are liable
even if they have only theoretical control, they will exercise it in all
instances.62  The argument suggests this practice will lead to censorship
and the restriction of the free flow of information.63
The critics are correct. The result may lead to a restriction on the free
flow of information---hopefully only properly protected information. This
criticism, however, regarding the "restriction of free flow of information"
does not rebut the element of the vicarious infringement analysis that
focuses on the relationship between the defendant and the infringer. One
of two questions concerning this element of the analysis is whether the
defendant service providers derive direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity sufficient to bring them within the scope of a "business
relationship"' as defined in the White Paper. It seems reasonable to
conclude that if uploading and downloading files containing copyright
protected material serves as an inducement to potential subscribers, then
that inducement materially benefits the online service provider.
A recently decided case, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA,65 one of
the few precedent-setting cases in this emerging body of "cyberspace"
law,66 justified holding an online service provider liable. The court
reasoned that the provider induced subscribers to become members by
offering as a service the capacity to upload and download copyright
protected video games.67 The court stated:
61. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
62. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 36; Niva
Elkin-Koren, supra note 11.
63. Elkin-Koren, supra note 11, at 348.
64. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, § 6.2, at 708; see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 304
(outlining the test for vicarious liability, and stating that where a court cannot find contributory
infringement because defendant has no knowledge and did not induce the direct infringer, liability
may still attach where the defendant had (1) the power to exercise control over the infringing
activity, and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringement).
65. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
66. It has been noted that there is a pressing need for binding precedent in the emerging area
of "cyberspace" law. See e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Judge Stands by Ruling on Prodigy's Liability,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at DI.
67. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687.
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Because users of the MAPHIA bulletin board are likely and en-
couraged to download Sega games therefrom to avoid having to
buy video game cartridges from Sega, by which avoidance such
users and Defendants both profit, the commercial purpose and
character of the unauthorized copying weighs against a finding
of fair use.6 8
This notion, touched on by the court in Sega, of an online service
provider profiting, at least potentially, from subscribers who desire a
service that actually encourages willful copyright infringement, as was the
case in Sega,69 is a fairly clear example of dubious motives on the part of
the BBS operator. Not all circumstances are as glaring, which is why it is
significant that the White Paper points out that "[n]o one rule may be
appropriate."7
For example, in Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe,7' a music
publisher filed a class-action suit on behalf of more than 140 music
publisher-principals of the Harry Fox Agency,72 alleging copyright
infringement of Frank Music's copyrighted musical composition Unchained
Melody.73 CompuServe and Frank Music settled the suit, leaving the legal
issues unresolved. 74 The settlement terms, however, give some insight as
to how these issues might be resolved between parties.
The settlement requires CompuServe to pay $500 for each of the
nearly 1000 compositions published by the plaintiffs that were uploaded to
and downloaded from CompuServe, or $473,500 collectively, including
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137.
71. No. 93-8153 JFK (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 29, 1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal).
72. The Harry Fox Agency is a clearinghouse that collects mechanical royalties on behalf
of writers of musical compositions. Mechanical royalties are payable to copyright owners when
their works are reproduced mechanically on configurations including records, tapes and compact
discs. PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 222.
73. Frank Music Sues CompuServe in NY Over Music in Bulletin Board, ENT. LITIG. REP.,
(Feb. 25, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Cumws file.
74. While this case has generated debate among copyright circles, it centered on amateur
activities of a small circle of hobbyists. Most of the alleged infringements occurred on
CompuServe's MIDI/Music forum, where musical instrument digital interface files can be
uploaded and downloaded. MIDI files resemble piano player rolls that enable a computer to
generate musical notes and rhythms. Most of the files on the forum are created by musical
enthusiasts using synthesizers, according to Jim Maki, the forum manager. Popular files are
downloaded fewer than two hundred times per year. What's the Score: Frank Music Settlement
Leaves Law Unsettled But Confirms Online Licensing Possibilities, VOORHEES REP., Nov. 17,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Curnws file.
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$94,500 in attorney's fees.75 The $500-per-work settlement represents the
minimum amount available under statutory damages in cases of non-
innocent infringement.76
The parties also negotiated a licensing arrangement that requires the
managers of music forums to receive licenses from the Harry Fox
Agency." The forum managers will pay the statutory rate, currently 6.6
cents per downloaded copy of a protected work.7"
Perhaps the most sensitive and vexing question in negotiating the
settlement agreement was how to assign responsibility to CompuServe.
CompuServe never conceded that it was a vicarious or contributory
infringer, and did not agree to license downloaded music. Conversely,
Compuserve is now requiring its managers to "take licenses and guaran-
tee[s] payments under those licenses."79
Given the nature of the settlement agreement, this author believes that
CompuServe could not escape copyright liability in the future under a set
of facts similar to those faced in Frank Music.80 In the words of Frank
Music's counsel, the agreement and the licensing arrangement effectively
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Voorhees Rep., supra note 74.
One of the most difficult aspects of negotiating the agreement was clarifying
CompuServe's role in the licensing arrangement. CompuServe did not admit
liability and will not take out a license for downloaded music. But it has agreed
to require its managers to take licenses and guarantees payments under those
licenses.
The two sides see that arrangement differently. Shulman [Alan Shulman of
Silverman & Shulman, counsel for Frank Music Corporation] says that while
CompuServe has protected its ability to make legal arguments in future cases, it,
as a practical matter, is accountable. "If the managers don't do what they are
supposed to do, CompuServe is on the hook," Shulman said.
CompuServe's counsel, Keller, says the guarantee was an accommodation
to facilitate settlement, not an admission of liability. Id.
80. Excerpt from settlement agreement between Frank Music Corp. and CompuServe states:
To the extent, if any, it is an infringement under applicable copyright laws for any
unauthorized use on CompuServe's Information Services of a musical composition
covered by this Agreement, CompuServe shall be liable therefor and, in addition,
any use of a licensable song for which a Mechanical License is revoked and
terminated by the reason of failure to pay royalties not timely cured after notice
shall be actionable as an act of copyright infringement as provided in such
Mechanical Licenses and under Section 115 of the U.S. Copyright Act but nothing
in this Agreement shall limit any rights or defenses of CompuServe or the
Managers under the Copyright Act in any action based on the foregoing.
Id. (citations omitted).
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leaves the information service provider "on the hook."'" The thirty-three-
year-old test outlined in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., requires the plaintiff, in
order to prove vicarious liability, to show that the defendant had the ability
to control the direct infringer's activity and financially benefit from the
infringement.82 This author believes the CompuServe settlement ar-
rangement exculpates neither CompuServe nor any other information
service provider in analogous circumstances.
The difference between Sega and Frank Music is that the defendant
BBS operator in Sega was a less sympathetic defendant than CompuServe
in Frank Music. The hobbyists sharing their music via an open forum on
CompuServe appeal to all the best intentions of the information superhigh-
way: people in different locations, united in a common interest, brought
together through a technology that makes otherwise unfeasible interaction
possible. By contrast, in Sega, the defendant was baldly enticing members
to use its service in order to obtain free video game software.83
But despite this essential difference--CompuServe's innocuous
intentions--Sega and Frank Music both involve defendants who could have
been held vicariously liable under the test outlined in Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. Both defendants had control over the activities of the direct infringers,
or at least the hypothetical ability to exercise control, and both derived
financial benefit from the infringing activity.
When the IITF refers to a "business relationship" justifying vicarious
liability in appropriate cases, the analysis is incomplete when it alludes to
the policy enunciated in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.," namely that online
service providers "are still in a better position to prevent or stop in-
fringement than the copyright owner. Between these two relatively
innocent parties [the information service provider and the copyright
holder], the best policy is to hold the service provider liable. 85
One of the strongest reasons the information service provider is in a
"better" position than the copyright owner is because of the attendant
"anonymity" of the information service provider's subscribers in
cyberspace. 86 For example, "[e]ncoded pictures of child pornography and
81. Id.
82. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (1963).
83. Sega Enters. Ltd., 857 F. Supp. at 683.
84. See 316 F.2d at 308.
85. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 132 (emphasis added).
86. See George P. Long, III, Comment, Who Are You? Identity and Anonymity in
Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1177 (1994). Long argues against liability for service providers,
stating in part that:
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various copyrighted materials are often scanned into a computer and
anonymously posted to the Internet., 87 Additionally, support groups that
rely on anonymity for participation regularly communicate via the
Internet.88
This Comment does not attempt to determine the merit of anonymous
communication on the Internet, but merely argues that critics of vicarious
liability, who simultaneously support anonymity, cannot have it both ways.
If information service providers allow anonymous communication but have
the power to exercise control over a direct infringer and derive benefit from
the infringing activity, they should be responsible for communications and
file transfers therein.
The copyright owner cannot sue an anonymous entity, though perhaps
the copyright owner could gather information from the service provider
through discovery. But the system administrator, through its business
relationship with its subscribers, is clearly in the "best position" to prevent
copyright infringement.
Ultimately, where a service provider has a "business relationship" with
its subscribers that encompasses the two prongs of the vicarious liability
analysis, control over infringing activity and derivation of direct financial
benefit, the service provider should be held vicariously liable for any
copyright infringement.
B. Analogy to Other Types of Intermediaries
The White Paper cites an important law review article, The Proper
Legal Regime for Cyberspace,89 which attempts to sort out the truly "new"
issues presented by Internet technology--requiring new law-from those
that may appear new but that may be resolved merely by applying existing
law to new technology.9°  This type of analysis should be Congress'
Server administrators, Usenet site providers, and bulletin board operators should not
be held liable merely for distributing anonymous messages that contain illegal
material. The probable cause standard allows authorities to determine the identity
of the person directly responsible for such material, without implicating the
distributor. It would not be feasible for distributors to personally check the vast
amount of messages that are transmitted daily, and they do not have the acumen to
pass judgment on the legality of a particular message. Imposing responsibility on
distributors would have the effect of chilling electronic communication by
discouraging [system operators] who are concerned with liability.
Id. at 1213.
87. Id. at 1179 n.10.
88. Id. at 1184.
89. Hardy, supra note 11.
90. Id. at 994-95.
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central task when it considers amending the copyright statute to accom-
modate technological development. No other bodies of statutory law are
likely to be as sensitive to changes in technology, save perhaps for Federal
Communications Commission regulations.
For this reason, Congress must be cautious not to overreact to the
changes that Internet technology brings. The White Paper draws analogies
between online service providers and photo finishers, book sellers, record
stores, newsstands, and computer software retailers, all of whom could
incur direct liability as distributors of copyrighted material, or vicarious
liability if the circumstances warrant such a finding.9'
The White Paper merely references these entities but does not
elaborate on their potential liabilities. The problem with such analogies is
that they are simply too malleable in the hands of the advocate to be
instructive.
For example, in a recently published scholarly discussion concerning
vicarious liability for bulletin bulletin board operators,92 the author
concluded that the best analogy to an existing body of law is the landlord-
tenant relationship. The author reasoned that the landlord is like the BBS
operator because the landlord has limited control over the activities of the
tenants. Courts traditionally have held that landlords do not have as great
a duty of care to guard against illegal actions of lessees. By analogy, BBS
operators would not be responsible for copyright infringement by users.
However, BBS operators retain the ability to monitor activities occurring
on their bulletin boards. The author ultimately suggests the application of
that same lowered standard of care traditionally reserved for the landlords,
so that BBS operators would be liable only if they knew or had reason to
know of the copyright infringement.93
91. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 130. See generally Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co.,
23 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. Tickle, supra note 11.
93. Id. at 416-17.
The standard of liability imposed by the lessor-lessee model appears to best
represent the situation faced by the BBS operator. Like the BBS operator, the
landlord has limited control over the activities occuring in the leased property. As
a result, courts imposed a less stringent duty of care on the landlord. The BBS
operator, however does not technically fit the facts of this model because the
operator retains the ability to monitor the activities occurring on the bulletin board.
Instead of forcing the innocent BBS operator's dilemma into the old form of the
lessor-lessee model, courts should extend the standard of liability of that model to
apply to the BBS operator .... BBS operators should be liable for the copyright
infringement occurring on their bulletin boards only if they knew, or had reason to
know, of the presence of copyrighted material.
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The problem with this analogy is that it extracts a conclusion from the
landlord-lessee model when it is clear that the landlord-lessee model does
not conform to the contours of the Internet. It seems far better to apply the
conceptual law of vicarious liability, rather than draw a specious conclusion
based on fact patterns that simply do not apply to Internet transfers of
copyright protected material. Consider how the landlord-lessee model fails
when held to the light of the accepted vicarious liability test.
The argument should be rejected because it disregards the sound
policy against qualified liability articulated by Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,"
which provides that despite the tough strict liability policy applied in
copyright law, the "ostrich" defense has and should continue to be rejected
by courts because the protections conveyed by copyright law would have
limited application if an "innocent infringer" could bury its head in the
sand, blithely ignore infringement and thereafter disclaim responsibility.95
In other words, courts have traditionally disallowed vicarious
copyright infringers to turn a blind eye to infringement. This statement
presupposes the two prongs of the vicarious-liability test, namely that the
defendant has power to exercise control over the direct infringer's activities
and has a direct financial interest in the infringement. 96  While the
landlord lacks "power to exercise control" over the infringing lessee's
activities in many instances, the BBS operators retain control over the
infringing online user's activities in many instances.
Some BBS operators do not have a direct financial interest in the
infringement. Others, such as CompuServe, a defendant in Frank Music,97
require membership fees that accrue based on the amount of time a member
spends online. The more time the member spends online, the more money
the service makes. If members are spending time online to transfer
copyright-protected information, it follows that infringement is a direct
financial benefit to the information service provider.
This is a good example of why Internet-related legal issues should be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis, using traditional principles of vicarious
liability, rather than anticipated through a wholesale change in copyright
statutes. The White Paper aptly acknowledges that "[n]o one rule may be
appropriate" under the exception in the Copyright Act for common
carriers.9" This is one of the White Paper's most prudent statements and
94. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
95. See discussion part I.C.
96. See text accompanying note 46.
97. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, No. 93-8153 JFK (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 29, 1994).
98. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137.
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should be broadly applied. Additionally, analogies to other intermediaries
that are not presented in the context of accepted vicarious liability
principles should be viewed with professional skepticism because they are
confusingly pliant when applied in a vacuum.
C. The Legislature Rejected Modification of Traditional
Standards of Liability
As an additional justification for maintaining traditional standards of
liability for Internet service providers, the White Paper examines the
legislative deliberations preceding enactment of the 1976 general revision
of the Copyright Act.99 The IITF notes that "changes to the standards of
liability were 'considered and rejected'."' °  Quoting from the legislative
history on the issue of vicarious liability for business owners whose
independent contractors directly infringe the public performance right in
copyrighted works, the White Paper states:
A well-established principle of copyright law is that a person
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
is an infringer, including persons who can be considered related
or vicarious infringers.... The committee has decided that no
justification exists for changing existing law, and causing a
significant erosion of the public performance right.'0°
In a parenthetical, the White Paper alludes to the "dance-hall cases,"
indicating they were the subject of the Congressional comment regarding
independent contractor liability. °2 The dance hall cases illustrated the
rather extensive reach of the vicarious-liability doctrine. In these cases,
dance hall owners were liable for actions of independent contractors
(usually musicians), even where the contract expressly renounced all control
over the independent contractor's infringing activities." 3
The legislative history generally supports the proposition that, since
1976, Congress contemplated third-party liability for copyright infringe-
99. Id. at 133-35.
100. Id. at 133 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 134 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5775-76 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]).
102. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 122-27.
103. See Buck v. Russo, 25 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Mass. 1938) (holding that by employing
an orchestra the owner approved the infringing actions of the independent contractor); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 475 (E.D.S.C. 1924), aft'd, 2 F.2d
1020 (4th Cir. 1924) (holding that the employer of a musician vicariously violates public
performance right where the contract allowed the musician to choose songs to perform);
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
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ment. However, Congress did not specifically anticipate the era of the
online service provider, and it is clear that in most cases online service
providers are not independent contractors, like musicians in the dance-hall
scenario. "
Those arguing against copyright liability for online service providers
would likely, and perhaps justifiably, exploit that weakness and contend
that any legislative history from 1976 is moot in the wake of the Internet
evolution, and they would have a point. Obviously, there is nothing
preventing Congress from changing its position. The 1976 legislative
history, however, is merely one brick in a much larger wall suggesting that
online service providers should be held to traditional standards of vicarious
liability.
The White Paper quotes further from the Copyright Act's legislative
history:
Congress also determined that the innocent infringer provision,
which allows reduction of damages for innocent infringers "is
sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of
occasional or isolated innocent infringement, and it offers
adequate insulation to users, such as broadcasters and newspaper
publishers, who are particularly vulnerable to this type of
infringement suit." Congress believed that "by establishing a
realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its intended
deterrent effect; and it would not allow an infringer to escape
simply because the plaintiff failed to disprove the defendant's
claim of innocence."' 05
This recognition is significant for the online service providers because
it emphasizes the importance of the innocent-infringer provision. In
fairness, however, the innocent-infringer provision may need an overhaul,
not just for the sake of online service providers, but because it simply is
outmoded. The Copyright Act provides different remedies for different
degrees of infringement. °6  Specifically, § 504(c)(2) provides that:
"[Where] the court finds that [the] infringer was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright, the court... may reduce the award of statutory damages to a
sum of not less than $200."
107
104. See Tickle, supra note 11, at 413.
105. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 134 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 163)
(citations omitted).
106. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, § 12.2.1 at 341.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
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Just as other aspects of copyright law should remain-those which the
online service providers may abhor, such as strict liability standards for
infringement--so should other principles, which serve to ameliorate
damages for parties acting in good faith and to balance a harsh standard of
strict liability. This traditional provision contained in § 504(c)(2) will
protect some online service providers from undue losses resulting from
direct infringement by their users or subscribers. However, it is not the
impenetrable shield they may hope for because in order for an infringer to
be entitled to the lowered floor for recovery, the infringer must prove it did
not know its acts constituted copyright infringement and also that it had no
reason to believe they constituted infringement."'
Given the sophistication of most online service providers and the
attention that Internet-related intellectual property issues have received, it
may be difficult for an online service provider to successfully claim
unawareness under § 504(c)(2). In D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop,'°9
the defendant's lack of sophistication and the absence of copyright notices
on the copyrighted material were sufficient reasons for the court to apply
§ 504(c)(2). Perhaps the legislature could make some concession in this
provision by stating that where an entity has taken reasonable, good faith
steps to guard against infringement and an infringement still takes place,
it may be entitled to the lowered floor for infringement. Should the
108. Innocence is generally no defense to copyright infringement. Section 504(c)(2)
partially moderates the harshness of this rule by lowering the statutory floor for
innocent infringers .... It is questionable whether § 504(c)(2) is, as the House
Report states, "sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of
occasional or isolated innocent infringement," and whether "it offers adequate
insulation to users, such as broadcasters and newspaper publishers, who are
particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit." One reason the provision
for innocent infringement contained in § 504(c)(2) may be insufficient is that, to
be entitled to the lowered floor for recovery, the infringer must sustain the burden
of proving not only that it was unaware that its acts constituted copyright
infringement but also that it had no reason to believe that they constituted
infringement.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, § 12.2.1, at 341; see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Lyndon Lanes,
Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 731, 733 (Oct. 2, 1985) (awarding statutory damages of $250 for each
infringement, declining to reduce the award to the then-applicable $100 minimum; although
defendants did not act willfully, they did not meet their burden of proving that they had no reason
to believe their act constituted copyright infringement).
109. 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990) cited in WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 140 n.402. The
owner of the "Batman" copyrights sued several flea markets and retail stores for copyright
infringement. D.C. Comics, Inc., 912 F.2d at 35. The defendants had the burden under
§ 504(c)(2) to establish innocent infringement. Id. The district court held the retail store's
infringement was innocent, because of evidence that the infringing goods had no copyright
notices, and that a layperson would be unable to identify the infringing goods from the genuine
goods, based on their style, artwork and quality. Id.
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legislature adopt this approach, the court should be given broad discretion
to evaluate the genuine nature of the defendant's good faith.
This is not an entirely satisfying conclusion for the online service
providers, but the lowered damage provision for innocent infringement
must be balanced with the policy articulated in Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co.," which disallows even innocent infringers from turning a blind eye
lest it become a popular way to avoid liability.'
Unfortunately, there is no neat conclusion on this issue. Congress
may want to reexamine what constitutes an "innocent" infringer in the
information age. Perhaps this is one area where legislative change is
appropriate. This change should not come, however, solely at the request
of the online service providers, but rather as a response to the high, perhaps
increasingly unreasonable burden of showing "innocent infringement."
The fact that the legislature considered and rejected liability for
intermediaries when developing the 1976 Copyright Act is certainly not a
controlling justification to maintain that policy against online service
providers today. The law must change in many instances to embrace
technological development. Rather, it is merely one indication that the
policy of vicarious infringement has a significant history not only at
common law, but also in the statutory realm. This policy should not be
summarily discarded in the advent of a new medium that, at its core,
simply improves the facility with which individuals may transfer protected
works.
III. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
The White Paper states:
Copyright law imposes different standards of liability for direct,
contributory and vicarious liability. Direct infringers are held to
a standard of strict liability. Liability for direct infringement is
.. . generally determined without regard to the intent of the
infringer. However, the Copyright Act gives courts the
discretion to consider the innocent intent of the infringer in
determining the amount of damages to be awarded. Related
infringers--those found to be contributory infringers or
vicariously liable--are not held to strict liability, but rather to a
higher threshold for liability."2
110. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
111. Id. at 308.
112. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 129.
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This is an extremely dense summary of the difference between direct
and related infringers. In its attempt to be comprehensive, the White Paper
sacrifices detail on the two connected but distinct doctrines of vicarious and
contributory liability. Since the primary thrust of the White Paper recom-
mendation on online service provider liability is that the existing body of
statutory and common law should be used to analyze novel issues, it is
somewhat disappointing that the IITF did not spend more effort reviewing
the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability. For clarity, the
doctrines have been analyzed separately. To this point, this Comment has
addressed vicarious liability. From this point forward, the Comment
reviews the doctrine of contributory liability.
The White Paper enumerates the various reasons asserted by online
service providers to justify categorizing providers as "related" infringers,
rather than as "direct, contributory or vicarious" infringers." 3 The White
Paper rejects these arguments while favoring a higher threshold of liability,
a view this Comment supports. These issues should be resolved by
applying existing copyright law on a case-by-case basis. Although
contributory liability should be considered by the courts as they evaluate
these Internet-related issues, it should be applied to online service providers
very cautiously, more so than vicarious infringement.
A defendant must have acted in cooperation with the direct infringer
and must have known of the direct infringement in order to be held liable
for contributory infringement." '4 The more the defendant's acts are
intertwined with the infringing activity, the stronger the inference that the
defendant knew of the infringement." 5 Where it is obvious the defendant
and the direct infringer acted in collaboration, partnership, or agreement,
the court often will not consider the knowledge requirement because it will
be self-evident from the facts." 6
Contributory infringement generally takes one of two forms:
First, the defendant may act in concert with the direct infringer
by contributing labor to the infringing activity. The personal
element involved in the contribution of labor will sometimes, but
not always, also form the basis for an inference that the
defendant knew of the infringing activity. Second, the defendant
may act in concert with the direct infringer by providing
materials or equipment necessary for the infringement to occur.
113. Id. at 129-30.
114. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, § 6.2, at 708.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 6.2, at 709.
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The defendant's lack of personal involvement in the contribution
of materials or equipment will sometimes, but not always, imply
the absence of actual knowledge of the directly infringing
activity. 7
Contributory infringement is distinguishable from vicarious infringe-
ment because it requires knowledge of infringing activity and some sort of
cooperation between the defendant and the direct infringer. Vicarious
infringement merely requires possible control over the direct infringer's
activity and direct financial benefit from the infringing activity." 8 In
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,1 9 the
Second Circuit held that it would impose liability on one who knowingly
aids, organizes, supervises or controls a copyright infringement by
another. 20  This remains the general framework for assessing
contributory liability.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,21 the
Court added a requirement. This was a difficult case because the facts
strained the then-existing notions of contributory infringement. A critical
issue in this case was whether a party who supplied the means to infringe
and had no direct contact with the direct infringer, yet encouraged the
infringer through advertising, would be liable as a contributory
infringer.2 2 The Court held that the mere sale of the product does not
constitute infringement provided the product is "widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes."'2 3 This is a critical requirement and remains
good law today.
Envision for a moment a somewhat diabolical scenario: assume an
online service provider knows that certain members will increase use of its
service if it provided a mechanism for infringement. The service provider
knows unquestionably that its service is being used for infringing activity,
satisfying the first prong of the contributory liability test. Further, this
service provider makes it known that this is an intended use of its service,
satisfying the second prong of the contributory infringement analysis, by
acting in concert with the direct infringer.
After Sony, the question remained whether a service provider for
contributory infringement fails merely because its service is capable of
117. Id.
118. Id. § 6.1, at 708.
119. 312 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
120. Id. at 583.
121. 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see discussion supra part II.C.
122. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
123. Id. at 442.
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"substantial noninfringing uses," such as distributing news reports, properly
licensed copyrighted material, and facilitating communication between its
members. According to the court in Sega,'24 the answer is no. This is
a difficult decision because it seems at first glance to abandon stare decisis.
In Sega, the court found that the defendant was a contributory
infringer, even though theoretically the bulletin board operated by the
defendant was capable of substantial noninfringing uses."2 5 The court
may have decided that since MAPHIA used its board almost exclusively for
the promotion of transferring protected software, this ameliorated the
substantial noninfringing use consideration from Sony.
Perhaps the court found that, unlike Sony, where the defendant
relinquished all control over the VCR after it was sold, the BBS operator
retained control during the infringement and therefore satisfied one of the
key requirements for contributory infringement.
Courts should rarely, if ever, apply the contributory infringement
doctrine to online service providers. The Supreme Court has been
unequivocal in its assertion that where a product is capable of substantial
noninfringing uses, its creator should not be held liable for contributory
infringement.
The public policy underpinnings of this statement are not difficult to
imagine. Intellectual property law strikes a balance between providing just
enough incentive through a limited monopoly to inspire creation, but not
so much that it deprives the public of any more creative genius than is
necessary. Internet technology is extremely beneficial to the public. If the
words of the Supreme Court in Sony are to be given any effect,
contributory infringement must not apply unless the scope of the services
it offers are so narrow as to be incapable of any other use but an infringing
one.
IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright law provides an incentive for citizens to create works of
authorship. It is not designed to confer a private benefit; rather it is aimed
at providing for the common good.
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
124. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
125. Id. at 686-87.
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motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.
12 6
Justice Stevens went on to observe that:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim, is
by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.'27
There is no reason why Internet technology should dramatically alter
the underlying premise of copyright law merely because it provides ease of
access in an unprecedented fashion. A work is no less protected by
copyright, nor should it be, just because it may be transferred via exciting
new Internet technology. If there is an extant notion that information wants
to be free, particularly in the "coming age of solid state memory storage of
virtual reality, ' it is a woefully misguided one.
The time-tested principles of vicarious and contributory infringement
will not apply in all cases involving information service providers, nor
should they. The White Paper acknowledges this when it states that "[n]o
one rule may be appropriate,"' 29 but that does not mean that online
service providers should be exempt from vicarious or contributory liability
in every case either.
Courts must apply the existing body of law to the Internet in a
conceptual manner and not attempt to determine precisely whether a record
store, a landlord or a photofinisher provides a pristine analogy to Internet
service providers. The common law has articulated clear tests for vicarious
and contributory liability, and those tests must be applied to this new
technology.
126. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
127. Id. at 432.
128. Larry Kenswil, Is Copyright Adequate Protection in the Digital Age, I MULTIMEDIA
L. REP. 25, 27 (1995).
129. WHITE PAPER, supra note 7, at 137.
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The present copyright regime and the attendant body of common law
provides an adequate basis upon which the courts may rely, and, as a result,
a dramatic change in the Copyright Act exempting online service providers
from liability, in the words of the White Paper, "is-at best--prema-
ture."'
130
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130. Id.
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